Robert Fico (Prime Minister of Slovakia), Beata Szydłová (Prime Minister of Poland), Bohuslav Sobotka (Prime Minister of the Czech Republic) and Viktor Orbán (Prime Minister of Hungary) in Prague in December 2015. Source: Wikipedia
CELIA PÉREZ CARRASCOSA, Prague (Czech Republic)
Immigration is a regular topic of debate in Brussels. It is a sensitive issue in which it is difficult for all EU members to agree. For example, the Visegrad Group (comprising Poland, Hungary, Czechia, and Slovakia) tends to take a very different stance to the rest of the European Community on this issue.
The 2015 migration crisis markedly accentuated the differences between the Visegrad Four (also known as the V4) and the other EU members on this matter. These Central European countries, along with Romania, maintained that the main priority was to strengthen the borders of the supranational organisation and to help stabilise the countries of origin of those heading towards Europe. In fact, Prague, Bratislava and Budapest, together with Bucharest, voted against the relocation of refugees. It is important to note that Warsaw voted in favour but did not follow through due to a subsequent change of government.
This was not the last time that tensions between the quartet and the EU came to light. Last year, Brussels presented the new European Pact on Migration and Asylum, to which the V4 once again reacted with reluctance. Poland and Hungary voted against it; Slovakia and Austria opposed certain provisions of the agreement; and the Czech Republic abstained. To understand the Visegrad Group’s position, it is important to note that its experience with migration differs significantly from that of Western European countries such as Germany and France, which have been major destinations for migrants for several decades.
A traditional emigrants land
Lately, there has been a lot of talk about migration in the media, often without distinguishing between emigration and immigration. For this reason, before attempting to explain the migration issue in the Visegrad countries —and specifically in the Czech Republic— it is helpful to clarify these terms. According to the Royal Academy of the Spanish Language (RAE by its initials in Spanish), to immigrate means “to arrive in a foreign country in order to settle there”, while to emigrate means “to leave one´s own country to settle in a foreign one”. Both concepts fall under the broader term migration, which the RAE defines as “the geographical displacement of individuals or groups, generally for economic or social reasons”. It is also essential to define the term refugee, which is sometimes overused or misused in some media. According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR): “Refugees are persons who have sought protection in another country after leaving their own country to escape conflict, persecution and other forms of violence”.
Now, let us turn to the migration issue in the Visegrad Group, with a particular focus on the Czech Lands today.
Some European countries have a long history of immigration. In the 1960s, for example, West Germany became a labour destination for many Turkish workers. As a result, today there are approximately three million people of Turkish descent living in Germany[1]. Moreover, it is well known that Germany has a very attractive labour market, which has encouraged immigration for decades. Therefore, it is a country of migration destination. Currently, Germany is the EU member state with the largest immigrant population, hosting just over 14 million foreigners[2], which is 16.7% of the population in a country of 83,445,000 inhabitants.
In contrast, the Visegrad Group is not the most common destination for foreigners. According to Jan Kovář, who holds a PhD in International Relations and European Studies and is Research Director at the Institute of International Relations of the Czech Republic, the main reason why immigration in the Czech Republic is not as high as in Western European countries is that it has traditionally been a country of emigration. In fact, more than 300,000 people left Czechoslovakia during the socialist period[3]. Moreover, the transition to a market economy after 1989 resulted in unemployment and financial instability, which led to emigration to Western Europe in the 1990s and early 2000s, with Germany and, to a lesser extent, Austria standing out as destination countries for temporary labour migration from Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, the Czech Republic and Slovenia[4]. A striking fact is that Spain has been one of the preferred destinations for Romanians since the 2000s. According to the National Statistics Institute (INE by its initials in Spanish), the three largest foreign nationalities residing in Spain as of January 2024 were: Moroccan, Romanian and Colombian[5]. However, due to the return of many Romanians to their place of origin, by January 2025 the three main foreign nationalities in Spain were: Colombian, Venezuelan and Moroccan[6].
On the other hand, Carlos Gómez del Tronco, who holds a PhD in political sociology and is head of the Just Europe programme at the Czech think-tank Europeum, explains that “these four Visegrad states, in general terms, have conceived their states based on the assumption that they have an ethnic group that is the holder of the nation. This is different in France or Spain because state-building has often tended to precede the ethnic definition of the nation”. The sociologist notes that in the Czech case there was a process of ethnic homogenisation throughout the 20th century, as there were different ethnic groups that, due to different historical events, were either expelled or excluded from political life. “Then, in the early 1990s, we find in the census that the vast majority of the Czech Republic declares a Czech ethnicity. For many, there is a confusion of terms between what it is to be a Czech citizen and a member of the Czech nation. This means that there is an assumption that this is the country of the Czechs, very ethnically homogeneous. As a result, parts of the population may exhibit a certain reluctance towards particular types of migration, as well as expectations about what their integration should be like. And this sociological aspect is important to understand”, Gómez del Tronco adds. As for ethnic homogenisation, one example is the expulsion of Germans after the Second World War.
Labour immigration
While it is true that the Czech Republic is not as sought-after as Germany or Sweden, it is not true that this Slavic country is not a destination for some foreigners. In fact, it is a country with a long history of labour immigration. In the mid-1950s, socialist Czechoslovakia implemented educational and employment programmes with other Eastern Bloc countries – such as Syria, Vietnam and Cuba- through which workers and students from different countries came to the former republic to train and work and then return to their place of origin with a wealth of professional and academic experience, so it was a temporary immigration in most cases. This led thousands of men and women from different countries to pass through Czechoslovakia. Gómez del Tronco stresses that these labour programmes had a diplomatic function with other socialist states “and responded to the needs of the country’s economic model, which was oriented towards industry”. Furthermore, the expert points out that since the 1960s, the country has been in need of labour, and that this need continued after 1989. “After 1989, Czechoslovakia —and later the Czech Republic— became a country of immigration. They needed workers, who often came from Eastern Europe or Central Asia. And much of the immigration legislation responded to this type of immigration”, says Gómez del Tronco. Moreover, in parallel with the emigration of the Visegrad Four to Western Europe, these same countries became destinations for Russians, Belarusians and Ukrainians[7]. Dr Kovař also stresses that the most considerable difference between Brussels —and the Western EU states— and the Czech Republic —and other Central and Eastern European states— is that the latter countries consider that the EU borders should be totally closed, “like a fortress”, and people should be selected to come according to the economic needs of the receiving countries, as well as taking into account their high qualities and level of education. “It is mainly economic immigration”, Kovář points out.
To illustrate the experts’ point, in Eurostat we can see that most of the residence permits approved in the Czech Republic in 2022 and 2023, as well as in the rest of the Visegrad countries and Romania, were work permits. In contrast, in Spain, Sweden or Germany, the majority of permits issued were for family or other reasons, including international protection.
With regard to the Czech Republic, we observe a decrease of 10,017 residence permits from one year to the next, with a significant drop in permits issued for work-related reasons and a rise in those granted for other reasons. According to the expert Kovář, one reason why immigration is lower in the Czech Republic compared to other Western European countries is that immigrants from these countries tend to prefer destinations where there are already established communities of the same ethnicity, as these have been migratory destinations for a longer period. Similarly, we can see that residence permits for family reasons are quantitatively the most significant in countries such as Spain, Germany, and Belgium. This is because many legal immigrants are able to bring close family members to the country where they reside—following each country´s respective regulations—a process known as family reunification. France deserves special mention, as the academic reason is the number one of the granted residence permits, followed by the family reason.
Homogeneous immigration
As we have seen, Germany has the highest level of immigration in the EU. Another example of a Western European country with a high foreign population, especially when compared with V4, is Spain. According to the National Statistics Institute (INE by its initials in Spanish), there were 6,852,348 foreigners residing in Spain on 1 January 2025, representing approximately 13.96% of the country´s total population of 49,077,984. However, although immigration in Western Europe is higher than in the Central European quartet, the Visegrad Group also hosts a significant number of immigrants. Among its members, the Czech Republic has the highest number of foreigners. According to the Czech Ministry of the Interior, in March 2025 there were 1,073,303 foreigners[8], accounting for 9.84% of the population of 10,900,555. It is followed by Poland, which, according to data from the Foreigners’ Office, had 960,051 immigrants as of 7 June 2025[9]. However, it is important to note that the Polish Economic Institute estimates that there is around 2.5 million[10], which would represent 6.8% of the total population of 36,620,970. In third place is Slovakia, where the Annual Report on Migration and Asylum in the Slovak Republic in 2023[11] records 311,406 foreigners that year – equivalent to 5.7% of the country´s population of 5,424,687. Finally, in the Magyar case, data from the Hungarian Central Statistical Office indicate that there were 255,450 foreigners[12] in the country in January 2025, representing 2.6% of the population of 9,584,627.
As for the Czech Republic, data from various immigration reports published by the Czech Ministry of the Interior show that, over the past 20 years the three largest foreign nationalities in the country have consistently been Ukrainian, Slovak and Vietnamese. Immigration to the Slavic nation has been steadily increasing for years. However, it was in 2022—following Russia’s military intervention in Ukraine—that the foreign population grew exponentially, as the Czech Republic took in a significant number of Ukrainian refugees. In fact, more than 366,000 refugees from Ukraine are currently residing in the country. Of these, 155,000 are women and 106,000 are men between the ages of 18 and 65, who are part of the country’s working population[13] and contribute to the labour force of the host country.
Both Slovaks and Ukrainians are Slavic people and tend to integrate easily into Czech society. Moreover, they – the Czechs- share a very similar history and culture with the Slovaks, as they were the same country until 1992. It is therefore interesting to look at the three main foreign nationalities in Slovakia, which (according to the report mentioned earlier) are: Ukrainian, Serbian and Czech. Hungarians and Vietnamese follow in fourth and fifth place, respectively. Returning to the present-day Czech Lands, other foreign nationalities with a significant presence include Russians, Romanians, Bulgarians and Poles. Thus, the majority of immigrants in the Czech Republic are Europeans and Slavs. It is true that Romanians are not Slavs, but they are Europeans and also have a not-too-distant socialist past. Vietnamese are the most different from the Czechs, both physically and culturally. Nevertheless, as yours truly explained a few years ago[14], their integration in the Slavic country has improved over the years and today it is very successful. The first people to arrive came during socialist era, although immigration at that time was mostly temporary —though some did settle here—. In contrast, Gómez del Tronco explains that since the 1990s these Asians from the Indochinese peninsula have started to migrate to the Czech Republic for longer periods, “which implies different dynamics”, such as a greater interest in learning Czech. Apart from Vietnamese foreigners, Czechs of Vietnamese descent, who are culturally Czech, play a significant role. As the sociologist points out, the second and third generations have established a dialogue with the state and Czech institutions, which also support their socialisation. In Gómez del Tronco’s opinion, the Czech-Vietnamese community has its own public discourse, which they represent themselves. “This is very important: they speak for themselves. Nobody does it for them”, he emphasises. He adds that this community has an economic peculiarity, which is a predisposition towards trade, and that this facilitates their socio-economic integration in the country. He also highlights the activity of this community in civil society, such as their help during the pandemic. As a result of their integration in the Slavic country, the sociologist indicates that public opinion surveys about them show positive results.
The migration crisis of 2015
It has now been ten years since the refugee crisis that struck the European Union, particularly affecting Greece. Thousands of people fleeing war—mostly from the Middle East—embarked on a journey toward the EU. According to UNHCR, in 2015 more than one million migrants arrived in the EU via the Mediterranean and Balkan routes. Although most people came from the Middle East and African countries, media coverage largely focused on Syrian refugees. In response to this wave of migration, Angela Merkel’s Germany opted to open its doors in September of that year. As a result, Germany received nearly one million asylum applications in 2015. Moreover, at the end of August, Berlin temporarily suspended the Dublin Regulation[15] (for Syrians), which stipulates that asylum seekers must apply for asylum in the first EU country they enter. However, in October of the same year, Germany resumed applying the Dublin Regulation to Syrian nationals[16]. It is worth noting that the then-president of the Federation of German Industries (BDI by its initials in German), Ulrich Grillo, spoke positively—in the summer of 2015—about the arrival of refugees, viewing it as beneficial for the German labour market[17]. It is also important to highlight that during this humanitarian crisis, fake Syrian passports were being sold in Turkey to several migrants from North Africa and the Middle East who were attempting to enter the EU[18].
Faced with such a large influx of people that year—especially in Greece, where nearly half a million irregular migrants landed on its shores in the last three months of 2015 alone[19]—the European Commission proposed a relocation plan for 160,000 people, most of whom were located in Italy and Greece. This measure was strongly opposed by the Visegrad Group, which rejected it outright. According to Gómez del Tronco, there were two key moments leading up to the EU’s relocation plan. The sociologist takes us back to 2014 and explains that the EU saw a need to respond to migration coming from North Africa and the Middle East (the MENA region). He details how an emergency mechanism was proposed so that other EU member states could assist frontline countries, and the idea of assigning each country a specific number of migrants was raised. The expert points out that the Czech Republic rejected this approach from the outset. “As early as autumn 2014, Milan Chovanec [Minister of the Interior] stated that the Czech Republic was not willing to adopt such a mechanism, and instead proposed an alternative role for the country: to be prepared to receive Ukrainian refugees,” the sociologist notes. Indeed, the outbreak of war in eastern Ukraine in 2014 led the Czech Republic to begin receiving some of these refugees[20]—although the major wave of Ukrainian asylum seekers came after the Russian military intervention in Ukraine in 2022. Poland[21], on the other hand, had been more actively involved in welcoming Ukrainian refugees since 2014, partly to meet labour market needs[22]. However—similarly to the Czech Republic—the highest number of Ukrainian asylum applications came after the onset of the Russian-Ukrainian military conflict in 2022. The sociologist also notes that as early as 2014, Milan Chovanec floated the idea of holding a national referendum on the reception of asylum seekers, and emphasised the importance of the religion of the migrants being accepted or rejected. “This is very significant, because when discussing attitudes towards migration in this region, in the Czech Republic, it is crucial to examine what kinds of migration are being rejected,” he details.
By 2015, two mechanisms had been introduced to address the migration crisis. The first, as the sociologist explains, was a voluntary relocation scheme from Italy, Greece, or Hungary to other EU member states. Poland, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia agreed to participate, although the scheme was non-binding. However, the second mechanism involved mandatory relocations—binding quotas imposed by the EU. As a result, Prague, Bratislava, Budapest, and Bucharest voted against the measure, although they were obliged to implement it because it was passed by majority vote. (Warsaw initially supported it, but withdrew following a change of government). “At that point, political opposition to these mechanisms intensified,” the expert notes, “especially given that these countries had recently accepted voluntary relocation. This sparked a significant debate about national sovereignty.” Gómez del Tronco points out that these countries were not typical destinations for migrants from North Africa and the Middle East. “And we can be specific: Muslims. Because, there were indeed initiatives in Slovakia and the Czech Republic along the lines of ‘we will accept Christians’,” he highlights. At the same time, there was a perception that these migrants had no interest in settling in those countries. Gómez del Tronco also recalls that in the 1990s, first Czechoslovakia and then the Czech Republic accepted migrants fleeing the Yugoslav wars—many of whom, after being granted refugee status, went on to Germany. The sociologist stresses that there are major imbalances between Western Europe and Central and Eastern Europe. “Many migrants do not see the Czech Republic as a final destination and prefer to move on to western countries because they are wealthier, offer more generous welfare systems, or because they have family or community networks there,” the expert explains. Prague felt it was being forced to host people who did not actually want to remain in the Czech Republic, making refugee resettlement impractical. Furthermore, Gómez del Tronco mentions the exposure of Czech society to Islamophobic rhetoric and growing fears of jihadism since late 2014. As a result, much of the Czech public opposed refugee relocation schemes. Dr Kovář adds that politicians also wanted to satisfy a public that was, at least in part, resistant to Muslim immigration—another reason for their opposition to such mechanisms. Regarding the Schengen Area, Dr Kovář argues that both the benefits and the costs should be shared equally. Due to their failure to comply with refugee relocation obligations, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) ruled against Prague, Budapest and Warsaw in April 2020. Bratislava, however, was not condemned by the Court, as Slovakia had collaborated with Vienna in its refugee management efforts in 2015[23]—temporarily hosting 500 refugees who had been waiting in Austria. Moreover, although Slovakia initially rejected the relocation scheme, it did eventually receive some asylum seekers, including 149 Iraqi Christians[24], according to UNHCR. In the case of Prague, UNHCR data shows that the Czech Republic accepted 20 Syrian refugees in 2015, 32 Iraqis in 2016, and 57 Iraqis from Iraqi Kurdistan in the same year[25]. It is also worth noting that Austria was exempt from the relocation plan until 2017, since it had already accepted around 90,000 asylum seekers in 2015[26], prior to the adoption of the EU relocation measures.
With regard to Muslim immigration, France was the scene of several Islamist attacks in 2014 and 2015, which was a significant factor behind the opposition among some segments of Czech society to the arrival of Muslim immigrants. At the time, the Czech Minister of the Interior, Milan Chovanec, of the Czech Social Democratic Party (ČSSD by its initials in Czech), stated in an interview with the daily newspaper Právo[27] in November 2015 that the Czech Republic had no issue with Muslim immigration as such, but warned that the wave of migration could change that. In the interview, the former minister explained that the Muslim community in the Czech Republic -comprising around 20,000 people- was very well integrated and had not become radicalised, “even after the Paris attacks”. He also argued that the Muslim communities in the Czech Republic and France had developed in very different ways. He explained that the Muslim community in the Slavic country began to form during the socialist era and that the second and third generations had integrated without difficulty. By contrast, he recalled that, following Algeria’s independence in 1962, France received around one million immigrants. In his view, this was a major shock for French society. “We’re talking about whether we are capable of integrating thousands of people over many years… Many migrants have become second- or third-class citizens, live on the margins of society, and still feel like outsiders. That’s where frustration and radicalisation come from,” Chovanec reflected in the interview. From his perspective, the wave of migration could have a similar impact in other European countries. He also warned that the Islamic State could disguise its members among the crowds heading towards Europe. Furthermore, he stressed the need to strengthen the EU’s and Schengen Area’s external borders in order to better manage future migration crises. He also emphasised the importance of distinguishing between those seeking international protection and economic migrants. Regarding the latter, he underlined (in the same interview) that the EU should make it clear that “the only way to enter is through an embassy in their country of origin”. It is also worth recalling that, in seeking to address the migration crisis, the Visegrad Group regarded resolving the conflict in Syria and other parts of the Middle East—as well as combating human trafficking—to be of key importance.
As for the new European Pact on Migration and Asylum, approved in 2024 and set to enter into force in June 2026, its primary objective is to relocate migrants who mainly arrive in Mediterranean countries such as Spain, Italy, and Greece, thereby easing the migration pressure on Southern Europe. The most notable feature of this new agreement is the principle of mandatory solidarity among EU member states. Countries will be required to either accept a set number of immigrants, pay €20,000 for each person they refuse to take in, or provide financial support for the relocation process. Another provision of the pact is the storage of biometric data from asylum seekers, to prevent individuals from submitting multiple applications under different identities. In addition, applicants will undergo health checks, and authorities will collect information such as age and nationality. It is also highly relevant to note that Brussels plans to relocate 30,000 people per year under this new system. According to Gómez del Tronco, this pact resembles proposals made by the Visegrad Group in 2015, as it includes a degree of flexibility. However, the mandatory nature of the solidarity mechanism is what led Poland and Hungary to vote against the pact, arguing that “solidarity” loses its meaning when it is enforced. Slovakia opposed certain provisions, such as the €20,000 penalty per rejected migrant, and abstained from voting on other aspects of the agreement[28]. For its part, the Czech Republic also abstained, considering the system to be somewhat flexible—a positive step. Nonetheless, officials in Prague stressed that the pact still falls short, as it does not guarantee better protection of the EU’s external borders against illegal immigration—hence their abstention.
In relation to the relocation of refugees, it is important to recall that it did not succeed. This was not only on the part of the Visegrad Group, which refused from the outset, but on the part of the EU as a whole. Each country was allocated quotas, but did not meet them in full. Of the total allocated to Spain, only 11 per cent of the quota was fulfilled[29]. Finland and Malta took in approximately one third of what was agreed. Poland and Hungary did not take in any refugees. Bulgaria, Ireland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Ireland resettled less than 1% of the quota[30]. Where did many of these refugees remain? In Greece. Unfortunately, the management of the crisis by Brussels resulted in Greece becoming the place where large numbers of asylum seekers were left in overcrowded conditions. As of 2017, more than 62,000 people were still stranded on the Greek islands, with little hope for the future.[31]To this day, it remains unclear why Berlin was so hospitable to so many irregular migrants, particularly Syrians. What can be inferred is that, once Germany realised it could not provide assistance to all of them, it left many behind in Hellas.
Some EU countries toughen their migratory policies
It seems that some EU members are strengthening their measures in this area. For example, Sweden has made it more difficult for immigrants to access social benefits[32] in an effort to reduce migrant arrivals in the Scandinavian country. The new government in Belgium, where 36 per cent of the population is of foreign origin[33], has proposed that foreigners should not be eligible for social benefits until they have resided in the country for five years and is also considering making family reunification more difficult[34]. Asylum seekers in Austria are now required to undertake community work at federal, state or local level[35]. These are just a few examples of the subtle shift in migration management in some EU countries, excluding Spain. Regarding whether these changes could bring Visegrad and other EU members closer together in this area, both Kovář and Gómez del Tronco consider that there may be some overlap with some countries on migration issues aimed at preventing irregular migration. However, both argue that the migration sensitivities of countries such as France and the Czech Republic differ significantly. Nevertheless, a gradual convergence on this issue is underway among some EU members, and the new Migration and Asylum Pact bears more resemblance to the proposals formulated by the V4 a decade ago.
At times, when consulting certain media outlets or speaking with people unfamiliar with the country, one gets the impression that these four Central European nations are perceived as being anti-immigration simply for the sake of it—without any real reasoning behind it. However, we have explained what the foreign population in the Czech Republic looks like and why Prague does not align with Brussels’ migration stance. As we have detailed, there are currently just over one million foreigners residing in the present-day Czech Lands, including more than 366,000 Ukrainian refugees. This shows that the Czech state is not opposed to immigration. It simply has a different relationship with immigration compared to other Western European countries. Its view of the migration phenomenon is also distinct. It advocates controlled, legal immigration that is integrated into Czech society. Although labour migration constitutes the majority of immigration in the country, it cannot be denied that the Czech people have shown solidarity with Ukrainian refugees, whom they have been welcoming for years. It is also true that many people are fearful of, or mistrustful towards, Muslim immigration, which they believe could pose security risks to the country. Nonetheless, there is a Muslim community in the Czech Republic. Such fears may well be fuelled by news reports from France, Belgium or Germany, where Islamist attacks occasionally occur—and where, in Hamburg[36], Islamists demonstrated last year in favour of a caliphate. I would say that Czechs are generally cautious. Is that a bad thing? I would say it is neither bad nor good—it is simply different from other EU countries. The migration issue also reveals the diversity of opinion across the 27 member states. We are Europeans and our cultures are closely related, but our experiences, histories, and national identities are not the same. Naturally, there will be those who promote hatred towards foreigners—particularly Muslims—often by exploiting the kinds of news stories already mentioned. But the Czech Republic is not against immigration per se; it is opposed to migration measures being imposed upon it. Thus, it is also a question of sovereignty. It is worth noting that a position similar to that of the Czech Republic would likely be labelled right-wing (or even far-right by some) in Spain. However, in 2015 it was a coalition government led by a social democratic party that opposed the refugee relocation mechanism. And last year, it was a conservative government—led by the Civic Democratic Party (ODS, by its Czech initials), the equivalent of Spain’s Partido Popular (PP by its Spanish initials)—that abstained from the new pact due to its reservations. This, then, is a specifically Czech perspective, which does not fit neatly into the left–right boxes that others might wish to place it in.
Personally, I have been living in this wonderful country for a few years now. I consider myself lucky to have good Czech friends, who help me to understand how they see the world. In their view, immigration is not a problem, whether Muslim or not. What they generally perceive as problematic is the scale of immigration, of any kind. For example, a very good friend of mine says that if there are only a few foreigners, they can integrate. In fact, they have no choice but to integrate. However, according to her, if large numbers of people from a particular background arrive, they may form communities among themselves and have no real need to integrate (something that has not happened with Vietnamese immigration, for example). Whether this hypothesis is true or not will have to be checked by integration experts, but it is a view shared by several Czechs around me. And all the Czechs I know regard people of Vietnamese descent as Czech. They do not see them as foreigners, because they are Czech both legally and culturally. The cultural aspect is what they value most. Other friends here also believe that the Czech Republic should not undergo population replacement, as they warn is already happening—or could happen—in other EU countries. For this reason, they believe serious measures need to be taken to address the issue.
One could conclude that a large part of this Slavic nation places great importance on foreigners learning and speaking their language—something that may seem obvious, but not everyone does. For them, it is one of the most important things. And working. If you live here, they expect you to contribute economically to the country that has opened its doors to you. They expect you to adapt to the country you move to. They understand that you are the newcomer, and therefore it is you who must take an interest in the place where you live. In short, the traditional saying “When in Rome, do as the Romans do” holds true in today’s Czech Lands.
The Czech Republic, where homogeneous, labour-driven immigration prevails © 2025 by Celia Pérez Carrascosa is licensed under CC BY-NC-ND 4.0
[1] “Alamnya”: 60 años de inmigración turca en Alemania Deutsche-Welle (DW) 30.10.2021 https://www.dw.com/es/almanya-60-a%C3%B1os-de-inmigraci%C3%B3n-turca-en-alemania/a-59672207
[2] Rohdatenauszählung ausländische Bevölkerung Statistisches Bundesamt. https://www.destatis.de/DE/Themen/Gesellschaft-Umwelt/Bevoelkerung/Migration-Integration/Tabellen/rohdaten-auslaendische-bevoelkerung-zeitreihe.html (Accessed 18 April 2025 )
[3] 1968: Po okucapci emigrovalo z Československa přes 300 tisíc lidí IDNES.CZ 04.09.2018 Ivo Helikar https://www.idnes.cz/zpravy/domaci/1968-vypadalo-to-jako-v-anekdote-posledni-zhasne.A180827_153251_domaci_heli
[4] Flujos migratorios desde Europa central y oriental después de 1989 Centro Superior de Investigaciones Científicas 28.05.2010 Mikolaj Stanek https://www.cepc.gob.es/publicaciones/revistas/historia-y-politica/numero-23-enerojunio-2010/flujos-migratorios-desde-europa-central-y-oriental-despues-de-1989-1
[5] Censo Anual de Población Instituto Nacional de Estadística (INE) 19.12.2024 https://www.ine.es/dyngs/Prensa/CENSO2024.htm#:~:text=La%20poblaci%C3%B3n%20residente%20en%20Espa%C3%B1a,(el%2013%2C4%25).
[6] Estadística Continua de Población (ECP) Instituto Nacional de Estadística (INE) 01.01.2025 https://www.ine.es/dyngs/Prensa/es/ECP4T24.htm
[7] Flujos migratorios desde Europa central y oriental después de 1989 Centro Superior de Investigaciones Científicas 28.05.2010 Mikolaj Stanek https://www.cepc.gob.es/publicaciones/revistas/historia-y-politica/numero-23-enerojunio-2010/flujos-migratorios-desde-europa-central-y-oriental-despues-de-1989-1
[8] Čtvrtlení zpráva o migraci za I. čvrtlení 2025 https://mv.gov.cz/clanek/ctvrtletni-zprava-o-migraci-za-i-ctvrtleti-2025.aspx
[9] Urzad do Spraw Cudzoziemców https://migracje.gov.pl/statystyki/zakres/polska/(It is an interactive map, so it is updated with new data.)
[10] Co trzeci Polak zawyza liczbe cudzoemców w Polsce Polski Instytut Ekonomiczny (18.06.2024) https://pie.net.pl/co-trzeci-polak-zawyza-liczbe-cudzoziemcow-w-polsce/#:~:text=Rzeczywista%20skala%20migracji%20oraz%20jej,jest%20ich%20ponad%203%20mln.
[11] Annual Report on Migration and Asylum in the Slovak Republic in 2023 Julio de 2024, Bratislava (available in PDF format on the internet)
[12] Magyarországon tartózkodó külföldi állampolgárok, az állampolgárság országa és nem szerint https://www.ksh.hu/stadat_files/nep/hu/nep0023.html
[13] Uperchlíků z Ukrajiny v Česku přibývá. Státu se vyplácejí Novinky.cz Petr Svorník (11.04.2025) https://www.novinky.cz/clanek/domaci-uprchliku-z-ukrajiny-v-cesku-pribyva-statu-se-vyplaceji-40516543
[14] Czechia, destination of the Vietnamese diaspora in Europe Crónicas del corazón de Europa, Celia Pérez (29.06.2020) https://cronicascorazoneuropa.com/2020/06/29/czechia-destination-of-the-vietnamese-diaspora-in-europe/
[15] Germany and refugees: A chronology Wesley Dockery – Deutsche-Welle (DW) (09.04.2017) https://www.dw.com/en/two-years-since-germany-opened-its-borders-to-refugees-a-chronology/a-40327634
[16] Berlín devolverá a sirios a país por el que ingresen a la UE Deutsche Welle (DW) (10.11.2015) https://www.dw.com/es/alemania-devolver%C3%A1-a-sirios-al-pa%C3%ADs-por-el-que-ingresen-a-la-ue/a-18841804
[17] Los refugiados, una esperanza de la economía alemana La Vanguardia (06.09.2015) https://www.lavanguardia.com/internacional/20150906/54436291218/refugiados-esperanza-economia-alemana.html
[18] Fake Syrian Passports a Way Out of Africa, Mideast Into Europe ABC News 01.09.2015 https://abcnews.go.com/International/fake-syrian-passports-war-weary-fleeing-europe/story?id=33450833
[19] Casi medio millón de inmigrantes llegaron a Grecia al final de 2015 Reuters 10.03.2016 https://www.reuters.com/article/lifestyle/casi-medio-milln-de-inmigrantes-llegaron-a-grecia-al-final-de-2015-idUSKCN0WC1HO/
[20] Česko přjme během dvou let 1500 uprchliků,chce si je samo vybírat Novinky.cz 08.07.2015 https://www.novinky.cz/clanek/domaci-cesko-prijme-behem-dvou-let-1500-uprchliku-chce-si-je-samo-vybirat-312203
[21] Focus on families and migration rationalization: The Visegrad Group’s method Róbert Gönczi – Warsaw Institute 13.10.2024 https://warsawinstitute.org/focus-on-families-and-migration-rationalization-the-visegrad-groups-method/
[22] Ukrajinci utíkají před válkou. Kam? Eva Bobůrková – Vesmír 03.11.2016 https://vesmir.cz/cz/on-line-clanky/2016/11/ukrajinci-utikaji-pred-valkou-kam.html
[23] EU takes Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic to court for refusing refugee quotas but not Slovakia The Slovak Spectator (08.12.2017) https://spectator.sme.sk/politics-and-society/c/eu-takes-poland-hungary-and-the-czech-republic-to-court-for-refusing-refugee-quotas-but-not-slovakia?utm_source=chatgpt.com
[24] UNHCR Submission for the Universal Periodic Review – Slovakia (2019) https://www.refworld.org/policy/upr/unhcr/2019/en/122462
[25] UNHCR Ressettlemnt Handbook and Country Chapters – Country Chapters Czech Republic (2018) https://www.unhcr.org/us/media/unhcr-resettlement-handbook-country-chapter-czech-republic
[26] Austria wants out of EU refugee relocation system Deutsche-Welle (DW) (28.03.2017) https://www.dw.com/en/austria-wants-exemption-from-eu-refugee-relocation-system/a-38163635?utm_source=chatgpt.com
[27] Chovanec: Muslimové u nás nejsou problém. Migrační vlna to však může změnit Jan Martinik – Part of the interview with Právo newspaper, por Novinky.cz – (22.11.2015) https://www.novinky.cz/clanek/domaci-chovanec-muslimove-u-nas-nejsou-problem-migracni-vlna-to-vsak-muze-zmenit-332850
[28] Slovensko a štáty V4 sa vyslovili proti reforme migračného systému EU (, uviedol Kamenický HNONLINE.SK (14.05.2024) https://hnonline.sk/svet/96149241-slovensko-a-staty-v4-sa-vyslovili-proti-reforme-migracneho-systemu-eu-uviedol-kamenicky
[29] España y Europa incumplen de largo su compromiso de acogida de refugiados La Vanguardia (26.09.2017) https://www.lavanguardia.com/internacional/20170926/431576776375/espana-europa-incumplen-compromiso-acogida-refugiados.html
[30] El “fracaso absoluto” del plan de Bruselas para reasentar a los refugiados Euronews (08.09.2016) https://es.euronews.com/2016/09/08/el-fracaso-absoluto-del-plan-de-bruselas-para-reasentar-a-los-refugiados
[31] CEAR denuncia que las políticas de la UE han convertido a Grecia en una ratonera Comisión Española de Ayuda al Refugiado (CEAR), 26.05.2017 https://www.cear.es/nota-de-prensa/cear-denuncia-las-politicas-la-ue-convertido-grecia-una-ratonera-refugiados/
[32] Suecia restringirá prestaciones sociales a los inmigrantes Deutsche-Welle (DW) (20.10.2023) https://www.dw.com/es/suecia-restringir%C3%A1-prestaciones-sociales-a-los-inmigrantes/a-67161053#:~:text=El%20gobierno%20derechista%20de%20Suecia,buscar%20trabajo%20y%20aprender%20sueco.
[33] [33] Reemplazo poblacional en Bélgica: casi el 80% de los habitantes de la región Bruselas-Capital son de origen extranjero Rubén Pulido, La Gaceta (15.06.2025) https://gaceta.es/europa/reemplazo-poblacional-en-belgica-casi-el-80-de-los-habitantes-de-la-region-bruselas-capital-son-de-origen-extranjero-20250615-0300/
[34] Bélgica aplicará con su nuevo Gobierno la política migratoria más estricta de su historia Swissinfo.ch (03.02.2025) https://www.swissinfo.ch/spa/b%C3%A9lgica-aplicar%C3%A1-con-su-nuevo-gobierno-la-pol%C3%ADtica-migratoria-m%C3%A1s-estricta-de-su-historia/88820631
[35] El Gobierno austríaco endurece su normativa para los solicitantes de asilo Euronews (17.07.2024) https://es.euronews.com/2024/07/17/el-gobierno-austriaco-endurece-su-normativa-para-los-solicitantes-de-asilo
[36] Un millar de islamistas se manifiesta nuevamente en Hamburgo Deutsche-Welle (DW) (11.05.2024) https://www.dw.com/es/un-millar-de-islamistas-se-manifiesta-nuevamente-en-hamburgo/a-69054334